For Taiwan, Trump’s Strategic Ambiguity Brings Anxious Uncertainty

Since returning to the White House, Donald Trump has chosen his words carefully when it comes to Taiwan. When a reporter pressed him on the U.S.-allied self-governing island that China claims as its own on Wednesday, Feb. 26, Trump refused to give a straightforward answer. 

“I never comment on that,” Trump said at the White House after being asked if the U.S. would ever allow China to take control of Taiwan by force. “I don’t want to ever put myself in that position.”

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Trump’s lack of specific commitments as President isn’t a new strategy for the U.S. relationship with Taiwan, but observers say there are other clues as to how his administration may approach the issue.

When asked by TIME last year if the U.S. should defend Taiwan if China invades, Trump leaned into the longstanding U.S. policy known as strategic ambiguity. “I’ve been asked this question many times and I always refuse to answer it because I don’t want to reveal my cards,” he said. “I wouldn’t want to give away any negotiating abilities by giving information like that to any reporter.”

Reflecting his transactional and more insular approach to foreign policy, Trump told Bloomberg Businessweek last June that Taiwan should pay the U.S. for defense, especially after how the island “took” the U.S. semiconductor business: “You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.”

It’s not unlike his recent dealings with Ukraine, in which Trump has shown willingness to negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin and potentially try to facilitate the ceding of Ukrainian territory to avoid further fighting.

Kevin Chen, associate research fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, previously told TIME that China may be able to take Taiwan “without too much U.S. interference” if Beijing is able to strike a similar deal with Washington.

Taipei is not risking it. As Trump has repeated comments about wanting more investment from Taiwan, President William Lai Ching-te said that his government “is willing to cooperate with the U.S. in every aspect” and has promised to increase its own defense spending to 3% of its GDP.

Here’s what to know.

The basic history of U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan relations

After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, two governments laid claim to China: the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which took over the mainland, and the Republic of China (ROC) which defected to the island of Taiwan. The U.S. initially recognized the ROC, but in 1972, when then-President Richard Nixon visited the mainland, the U.S. and the PRC government issued a communique that took a step forward in normalizing relations, including on the issue of Taiwan. The PRC asserted that “Taiwan is a province of China,” and in turn, the U.S. acknowledged that the Chinese—across the mainland and Taiwan—maintain there is “one China,” and that Washington will not challenge that principle and will let the Chinese settle the dispute themselves. This has come to be known as the “one China” policy, which Washington and many other countries maintain some version of. 

In 1979, to further placate Beijing and improve ties, the U.S. formally switched diplomatic relations with China from the ROC to the PRC, through another joint communique. However, not wanting to abandon its relationship with Taiwan altogether, the U.S. said in the 1978 communique that it will maintain “cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations” with the island government. 

In 1979, the same year the switch went into effect, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which stated that peace and stability in the region covering Taiwan and China is “in the political, security, and economic interests” of the U.S. and that the switching of diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing rests on expectations that “the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” Under the law, the U.S. is expected to provide Taiwan with defense arms, but it did not explicitly say Washington would come to Taipei’s defense in the event of an attack. (The U.S. and Taiwan had a mutual defense treaty since 1955, but the U.S. unilaterally ended it in 1979.)

The provision of arms to Taiwan courted the ire of the PRC, so the U.S. under President Ronald Reagan in 1982 clarified through another communique that it “does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan” and that it “intends to gradually reduce its sale.” The Reagan Administration knew this would in turn worry Taiwan and so, weeks before issuing the clarification, gave Taipei what is now known as “Six Assurances”: that a date to end selling arms to Taiwan has not been reached; that the U.S. did not agree to consulting the PRC prior to selling arms to Taiwan; that the U.S. will not mediate between Taipei and Beijing, that the Taiwan Relations Act will not be revised, that the U.S. position on Taiwan sovereignty has not changed, and that the U.S. will not pressure Taipei into negotiating with the PRC.

The U.S. has since maintained unofficial relations with Taiwan, with the Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances, and what’s come to be known as the Three Communiqués serving as the bedrock for these ties. As de facto embassies, Taiwan has the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in D.C., with 12 other offices throughout the states and U.S. jurisdictions, while the U.S. has its counterpart office, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a non-profit corporation in Taipei mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act.

Ties during Trump’s first term

One of the hallmarks of the first Trump Administration was a tougher stance towards China compared to his predecessors, through tit-for-tat tariffs and an Indo-Pacific strategy that aimed to curb Beijing’s growing influence in the Western Pacific. Alongside this, U.S.-Taiwan relations became more robust. 

In 2018, Congress passed theTaiwan Travel Act, which authorized high-ranking officials from both Taipei and Washington to visit each other, after years of not doing so to avoid upsetting China. Beijing condemned the law, saying it violates the “one China” principle and could damage U.S.-China relations, but the visits went ahead—and have continued. Taiwan’s then-President Tsai Ing-wen stopped over in New York and Denver in July 2019, meeting with U.S. lawmakers along the way. And in February 2020, then-Vice-President Lai attended the National Prayer Breakfast. Then-Health Secretary Alex Azar visited Taiwan in 2020 to tout the island’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, to Beijing’s chagrin. (After Trump’s term, then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi further angered Beijing by visiting in 2022.)

During the first Trump administration, defense sales to Taiwan were also the highest in years: the U.S. made some $18 billion in Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan, including a major $8 billion sale of 66 fighter jets. By contrast, President Barack Obama’s eight years in office saw $14 billion in Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan (though there was another $6.2 billion in Direct Commercial Sales), while Joe Biden’s four-year presidency sold just over $8 billion.

While China has also pressured other countries to abandon relations with Taiwan to diminish the island’s diplomatic profile and has condemned Taiwan’s inclusion in international forums like the World Trade Organization, the Trump Administration in 2020 enacted the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act, which states the U.S. should  advocate for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations.

Under Trump 2.0, a focus on finances—and potential dealmaking on both sides of the Taiwan Strait

Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute think tank in D.C., tells TIME that the second-term Trump Administration has so far honed in on three aspects of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship: the trade deficit, the reshoring of semiconductor manufacturing, and defense-burden sharing.

“For Trump, ultimately, what he cares about [is] the balance of trade,” says Chin-Hao Huang, associate professor at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. 

A major source of the record-high $73.9 billion trade deficit the U.S. has with Taiwan comes from U.S. imports of semiconductors, the computer chips vital to industries like AI. Taiwan is home to the world’s largest contract chipmaker, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), and although the Biden Administration tried to improve domestic manufacturing through policies such as the CHIPS Act, Trump has claimed that Taiwan “stole” the U.S. chip business, which Taipei has denied. Trump has since threatened a minimum of 25% tariffs on imports of computer chips.

Some of Trump’s colleagues in the House have urged the abandonment of the “one China” policy to foster deeper business ties and a free trade agreement with Taiwan. Huang thinks that’s unlikely, however, because Trump generally prefers protectionist policies. “Trump’s ultimate red line is he wants to see jobs come back to the United States,” says Huang. “He wants to see the semiconductor industry in the United States thrive again. So this means investment.”

As for defense, while Trump has said little, the people in his orbit have offered more clues as to how the Administration may approach Taiwan. Trump’s now Vice President J.D. Vance suggested last year that the U.S. should take a more proactive role in Taiwan’s defense, telling the New York Times: “We should make it as hard as possible for China to take Taiwan in the first place.” He also previously told Fox News that the U.S. should prioritize preparedness for military conflict with China over other ongoing conflicts: “America is stretched too thin. We do not have the industrial capacity to support a war in Ukraine, a war in Israel, potentially a war in East Asia if the Chinese invade Taiwan, so America has to pick and choose,” he said. “The Chinese are focused on real power. They’re not focused on how tough people talk on TV or how strong our alleged resolve is. They’re focused on how strong we actually are, and to be strong enough to push back against the Chinese, we’ve got to focus there.”

In early February, the State Department removed the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” from its fact sheet on Taiwan. It’s not the first time the Department has done so, removing the phrase in 2022 but reinstating it following protest from China. The State Department said it was a routine update, but Beijing protested again against the latest wording change, saying the U.S. has “gravely backpedaled” on the issue of Taiwan.

“As is routine, the fact sheet was updated to inform the general public about our unofficial relationship with Taiwan,” a State Department spokesperson told NBC in a statement, adding: “The United States remains committed to its one China policy.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said last week that U.S. commitments to Taiwan are clear: “We are against any sort of compelled, forced change of status. That’s been our policy; that remains our policy.” And Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said earlier this month that despite the Administration’s “America First” policy, he’s keen to bolster alliances in the Indo-Pacific region, adding: “We want to send the signals to China that that area will be and continues to be contested.”

Elbridge Colby, a known China hawk and nominee for undersecretary of defense for policy who faces a contentious confirmation vote in early March, has taken a more cautious approach, echoing Trump in pushing Taiwan to increase its own defense spending while also advising that the U.S. “avoid unnecessarily poking Beijing on a ‘core issue’ for them.”

Nicholas Lardy, a non-resident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, tells TIME he would be “very surprised” if Trump were to significantly change the status quo: “The reality is the policy of ‘one China’ and strategic ambiguity has served very very well for decades.”

Lardy also notes that U.S. public opinion is strongly against China. “There’s a very widespread view that they have been unfair on trade and other issues,” he says. Data from an October 2024 survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs suggests Americans are generally in favor of providing Taiwan support, at least short of direct military intervention.

At the same time, Steve Tsang of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London says Trump has touted being against war and would not risk Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “humiliation.”

“I haven’t seen any evidence that Trump cares much about Taiwan for being a shining example of a U.S.-sponsored democracy,” Tsang tells TIME. “The evidence I have seen is that Trump is first and foremost for Trump, for which he would want to maintain a working relationship with Xi, so he could do some kind of a deal that would project Trump as a winner.”

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