The Ukraine peace process initiated by the Trump Administration—which this week saw Ukraine agree to a 30-day ceasefire and Russia respond with tough demands—has led to panic in European capitals about the U.S. abandoning its NATO allies, and their urgent need to be able to defend themselves against Russia.
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A measure of European rearmament is indeed desirable. But for European governments to do this in a mad rush and atmosphere of panic risks decisions that they will regret later, will actually weaken European security, and cost far too much in ways that their populations will not support for long.
First of all, European countries need to decide how much to spend and what to buy. The sums being discussed are not small. Leading European governments are calling for military spending to be increased to 3% of GDP. Some analysts want 3.5% and Trump has even floated 5%. E.U. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has set the immediate priority at €800 billion ($872 billion) to rearm Europe, with more expected to follow.
There are two main pitfalls that Europe needs to avoid. The first is to tailor rapid rearmament to the idea of sending a large military force to Ukraine to guarantee a peace settlement and if necessary fight Russia there. This is almost certainly not going to happen, and should not happen, though the idea seems to be alive in London, Paris, and Kyiv. Russia has repeatedly and categorically rejected Western troops in Ukraine, and the Trump Administration has refused to back such a force. It would therefore have to be ready and able to fight Russia—a nuclear superpower—without U.S. support. Majorities in almost every European country are against this, and it would require virtually the entire deployable strength of the U.K., France, and Germany—which would mean stripping Poland and the Baltic States of protection.
The European drive to rearm is being driven, or justified, in part by the fear that Russia may try to test NATO by attacking Poland or the Baltic States. But as David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post, European leaders say they are so worried about an attack that they want to send troops to Ukraine. That would give Russia the opportunity to “test” them at far lower risk and for far greater gain.
The second pitfall would be to imitate U.S. policy in recent decades, and spend vast sums on limited numbers of high-tech weapons platforms like fighter aircraft, battle tanks, and warships. Yet much cheaper weapons like surveillance and killer drones; anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles; howitzers and the shells to supply them; and landmines have actually proved critical in Ukraine.
Read More: The Peril of Ukraine’s Ammo Shortage
Then there is the question of where the weapons will come from. The Trump Administration has been encouraging Europe to buy American arms, as had the Biden and other administrations before it. But France and several European governments are emphasizing that rearmament should be based on European weapons, and are seeking to gain public approval by selling this as a program for industrial revival. Even in the best scenario this will take considerable time. Deep differences are already appearing. Poland, which together with the Baltics is most fearful of a Russian attack, wants to strengthen its forces rapidly with U.S. weapons and not wait for European ones.
The weakness of Europe’s military industry is largely due to the difficulty of co-ordinating and pooling production between different countries. For the sake of truly integrated and efficient weapons production, all would have to give up some of their existing industries, and some would have to give up almost all of them.
These negotiations will be extremely painful and difficult. But there is time given that there is no realistic prospect of a Russian attack on another NATO member in the foreseeable future, given its experience in Ukraine and any sensible examination of Russian motives and thinking.
That time allows for a measured, well-thought out process tailored to Europe’s actual defense and industrial needs. It is now generally recognized that contemporary military technology strongly favors defense; and the Ukrainians destroyed virtually the entire Russian army that invaded in February 2022, and have fought subsequent Russian attacks to a standstill, not with tanks and fighter jets, but huge numbers of cheap drones, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, 155 mm howitzers, and landmines (with of course critical help from U.S. intelligence).
Without colossal new investment, Germany has already greatly increased its production of 155 mm shells, France can make many more Mistral hand-held anti-aircraft missiles, and European industry as a whole can produce huge numbers of drones. This will enable Europe both to deter another Russian attack and to provide enough long-term military aid to Ukraine to ensure that a new attack on that country would be horribly costly and dangerous for Russia.
The final reason European governments need to be cautious is what this all means for European unity and on other vital sectors of state activity. Italy and Spain, far from Russia and frontline states in the ongoing migrant crisis across the Mediterranean, simply do not see their own vital interests as threatened by Moscow. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has said that “we will have to prioritize defense over other stuff,” but this “other stuff” includes desperately needed investment in infrastructure and social welfare programs vital to domestic stability.
